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Abstract 
The offshore installation manager (OIM) is a unique role in the oil and gas 
industry with the legal responsibility for the health and safety of 
individuals on an offshore installation, as well as holding commercial 
responsibilities. Using exploratory, qualitative data based on 10 interviews 
conducted with OIMs, the information environment and behaviour of the 
OIM is described and areas for further research are explored. The OIM’s 
information environment is one which is complex and relies heavily on 
both formal and informal sources of information. Two modes of OIM 
information behaviour are identified; everyday information need, in which 
the OIM seeks, uses and shares information to maintain safe operations; 
and emergency information need, in which there is both reliance on 
information which must be known in order to react to an emergency 
situation, as well as a need for information to be accessible about the 
status of a rapidly changing environment. The OIM is both the user of 
information as well as a source of information for others and as such must 
be trusted, reliable and automotive.  
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Introduction  
The extraction of hydrocarbons from geological formations is a challenging 
process which involves operations both onshore and offshore. Such 
operations have been at the forefront of technological innovation and are 
boundary stretching, often conducted in inhospitable environments and 
unsafe conditions. The United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS), 
principally the North Sea, is regarded as one of the most challenging 
offshore environments in the industry. Offshore installations are remote, 
often subject to treacherous weather conditions, and the workforces who 
operate them undertake demanding shift patterns. The workforce may be 
comprised of permanent staff employed directly by the operators of 
platforms, but more regularly consists of a mixture of operator 
employees, contractors, sub-contractors and self-employed experts. 
A research team at Aberdeen Business School has over a number of years 
conducted research into the management of health, safety and 
competence [1, 2, 3], supported by OPITO (Offshore Petroleum Industry 
Training Organisation), a focal point for skills, training and workforce 
development in the oil and gas industry. An emerging theme from 
previous research projects was the criticality of safety leadership and its 
impact on the safety behaviour of oil and gas industry employees.  
There are 107 oil platforms and 181 gas platforms in the UKCS [4]. There 
is a statutory requirement for all manned offshore installations to have an 
Offshore Installation Manager (OIM), the most senior person on board, 
taking legal responsibility for the health, welfare and safety of personnel 
on the installation, as well as responsibility for maintaining production 
efficiency of operations and maximising economic recovery. OIMs play a 
central role in creating and maintaining a safe environment on an offshore 
installation, yet have received limited attention from the academic 
community since the work of a group of psychologists in Aberdeen in the 
1990s [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. 
 
The present research sought to answer several questions: what 
constitutes the OIM’s information environment? What role does 
information play in the OIM’s workplace in terms of maintaining safe 
operations and responding to emergency situations? How does the OIMs 
information environment shape the OIMs information behaviour?  
 This paper presents the results of exploratory research from an interview-
based study of OIMs, sponsored by OPITO, in which OIMs were asked to 
describe the types of information they required for their role in terms of 
health, safety and emergency response, and how they share such 
information, to allow the research team initial insights into the OIM’s 
information environment and behaviour.  
 
Literature review 
Industry context 
With the first producing well in the UKCS struck in 1965 by BP, the oil and 
gas industry is one which has celebrated many achievements but which 
has also been from the outset visited by periodic disaster. The first such 
incident occurred in December 1965 when the Sea Gem platform 
collapsed during transportation, resulting in the death of 13 crew 
members [10]. As a result of the inquiry into the Sea Gem disaster it was 
recommended that offshore installations have an individual in a role of 
authority, similar to the captain of a ship [11]. 
 
The Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations) Act 1971 [12] stipulates the 
requirement for an OIM to be appointed for installations in the UKCS. 
However there were initially no guidelines on the competence of those 
individuals appointed, and this resulted in the selection of individuals with 
either Royal or Merchant Navy backgrounds [5] as this was considered the 
role most similar to that of OIM. 
 
In 1988 the worst disaster in terms of loss of life the industry has seen 
occurred in the North Sea. The Piper Alpha Platform was operated by 
Occidental and was situated 100 miles north-east of Aberdeen. On the 
evening of 6th July 167 men lost their lives in an accident which was 
caused by fire and explosion, although its root causes were attributed to 
poor communication and management, and in particular the performance 
of the OIM. A condensate injection pump, which had been disabled for 
maintenance by the day shift, was started by the nightshift “due to a 
failure in the transmission of information under the permit to work 
system1 and at shift handover” [13, p. 121 Para 6.188], and was the 
triggering action for the incident. It was found in the subsequent Cullen 
Inquiry that “in many ways merely lip service was paid to the permit to 
work system and that in reality communication was relied upon either by 
word of mouth or by habit … [and] such an approach put too high a 
premium on informal communications” [13, p. 194 para 11.4]. The OIM, 
Cullen concluded, would have quickly become aware that all safety 
systems in place were rendered ineffective due to the nature of the 
incident, and it was “unfortunately clear that the OIM took no initiative in 
an attempt to save life, even if it was that the personnel should choose 
the lesser of two evils by getting out of the accommodation as quickly as 
possible” [13 p. 163 para 8.35]. 
 
Piper Alpha was a key turning point for the industry in terms of the role of 
OIM, with a move from that of a figurehead to one of genuine and explicit 
safety leadership. This move has been facilitated through changes made 
in the selection and training of OIMs and indeed developments are still 
occurring in training standards with work carried out by OPITO [14]. Post-
Piper there was an attitude shift in industry more generally in terms of 
safety to a more proactive and mitigating approach to operations. The 
central recommendation by Lord Cullen was that every operator in the 
North Sea should prepare and submit a Safety Case to the Health and 
Safety Executive for approval. The Safety Case must demonstrate that 
sufficient precautions have been taken to avoid the realisation of a major 
accident hazard (MAH); incidents which could cause the death of or 
serious injury to five or more people, or result in significant damage to a 
platform, for example loss of well control, fire, explosion or even collision 
with another vessel. Recommendations were also made regarding the 
selection and training of OIMs, and specifically reference was made to the 
OIM’s ability to “obtain, verify and consider data communicated to him 
from various sources for immediate decision making, on which lives are 
dependent, as a unique feature of the managerial role and warrants 
specific consideration” [13, p. 353, para 20.59]. 
 
More recently in the Gulf of Mexico, the Deepwater Horizon rig sank on 
22nd April 2010 after an explosion and fire. Owned and operated by 
Transocean, whilst drilling on behalf of BP, 11 workers were killed and 16 
were injured; the resulting oil spill is considered the largest accidental 
marine oil spill in the world [15]. In 2011 the National Commission on the 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling submitted a report to 
President Obama in which recurring themes were identified “of missed 
warning signals, failure to share information, and a general lack of 
appreciation for the risks involved. In the view of the Commission, these 
findings highlight the importance of organizational [sic] culture, and a 
consistent commitment to safety by industry from the highest 
management levels on down.” [16, 2011, p. ix]. The Commission 
concluded that the failures attributed to the causation of the Macondo well 
blow-out could in the majority of instances be “traced back to underlying 
failures of management and communication” [16, p. 122] and reported 
that the companies involved “failed to communicate adequately. 
Information appears to have been excessively compartmentalized at 
Macondo as a result of poor communication.” [16, p. 123]. There were 
failures in communication between companies and within companies, and 
as a result critical decisions were made without sufficient contextual 
information or “even without recognition that the decisions were critical” 
[16, p.123]. 
 
Coincidentally, just hours before the Macondo well blow out, the 
installation was visited by four senior managers, all of whom had 
experience and detailed knowledge of drilling operations. However during 
the trip their attention was not focused on the well operations, but was an 
exercise to emphasise the importance of safety and transfer safety 
lessons. Despite this emphasis there was little attention paid to safety 
critical activities which were ongoing at the time [17]. 
 
Extensive evidence is thus provided from in depth post-hoc reviews of 
such disasters that information plays a key role in major accidents, either 
causally or in seeking to contain impact on personal safety and the 
physical environment. Information deficiencies have been found in (i) poor 
communication and sharing of information, with too great a reliance on 
informal communication; (ii) lack of awareness of information highlighting 
risks; and (iii) questionable ability of leadership in accessing, verifying and 
making sense of information, in particular where immediate decisions 
must be taken and situated in the context of an immediate need. 
 
Safety leadership 
Leadership is a complex interaction between the leader, their followers 
and the situation in which leadership takes place [18 p. 615]. With 
regards to safety leadership, particularly in the offshore environment, 
both the followers and the situation are elements which can change 
considerably in a short space of time. For example, a crew change or 
influx of specialist crew for a particular job leads to considerable variances 
in the employees on an installation at any time; it is unrealistic to expect 
an OIM to be aware of each individual’s knowledge, expertise and 
previous experience. Similarly the situation can change quickly, most 
notably in an emergency response scenario when rapid action and 
coordination is likely to be required. Management and leadership in the 
offshore environment is further complicated by the challenges of working, 
socialising and living with co-workers and subordinates, which has been 
found to influence supervisory decision making [19]. 
 
Leadership has been identified as a key component in maintaining a safe 
organisation; however there has been a limited amount of research into 
leadership in the major hazards sector. Due to deficient leadership being 
identified as a recurrent theme in the causation of major incidents such as 
Piper Alpha, Texas City2 and Deepwater Horizon, the Health and Safety 
Executive commissioned a review of relevant literature with the aim of 
identifying styles, attitudes, behaviours and practices which represent 
effective leadership for safety [20]. 
 
In the review, ‘transformational leadership’ was identified as a style which 
enhances perceptions of the ‘safety climate’ - the combination of beliefs, 
values, and perceptions about safety within an organisation [21]. This 
model of leadership can also influence safety by enhancing employees’ 
levels of safety consciousness (i.e. knowledge) [20]. The development of 
trust between leaders and followers was also identified as important to 
safety leadership, and this was found to be facilitated by open and 
accurate communication: 
“Safety communication between management and the workforce is 
associated with a reduction in the levels of risk taking behaviour, 
promotion of positive safety behaviours and reduced levels of self-report 
work-related pain.” [20, p. vi] 
 
A lack of open and trusting channels of communication for the sharing of 
safety related information was identified as a contributory factor to a 
major incident in 8 of the 16 cases examined by Lekka and Healey [20]. 
Millken, Morrison and Hewlin [22] suggest there can be a reluctance on 
the part of employees to share information up the managerial hierarchy if 
the information could be considered ‘bad news’, possibly due to 
perceptions that such sharing could lead to negative consequences. 
Hargie, Dickson and Tourish [23] do however suggest that employees 
generally wish to be kept ‘in the loop’ in terms of major corporate 
decisions and key issues, especially those which will have a direct impact 
on their work roles. Equally, they do not wish to be overloaded with detail. 
Any information shortfall may lead to an active rumour mill and 
heightened distrust in management; this can be overcome through the 
establishment of authoritative and credible communication channels for 
the rapid dissemination of information [23]. 
 
Focusing on the construction industry, acknowledged to be similar to the 
offshore environment, Conchie, Moon and Duncan [24] describe a 
fragmented workforce, which utilises contractors, with varying skill levels 
and differences in management hierarchies, languages, training and 
education – all of which can lead to disorganisation. In identifying 
contextual factors which influence safety leadership behaviours, the 
authors [24] define two categories; job demands and job resources. Such 
factors contribute to the depletion of supervisors’ energy and therefore 
their engagement in safety leadership. Job demands are comprised of 
excessive workloads, competing demands and situational constraints. 
These demands are especially problematic in terms of safety leadership as 
reduced time and energy lead to lower levels of visibility and availability, 
and therefore fewer safety interactions with the workforce. Also it was 
found that such job demands can foster a reliance on coping mechanisms 
such as acceleration (processing information at faster rates), avoidance of 
decision making, and filtration (subjective selection of information for 
processing) [24]. Job resources are considered as physical, social and 
organisational aspects of job roles which aid in the completion of tasks, 
help in reducing negative consequences of job demands and contribute to 
personal growth. Conchie, Moon and Duncan [24, p. 116] found that 
reducing the demands placed on supervisors is one way for organisations 
to aid in the development of safety leadership. 
 
A concept strongly related to safety in offshore environments is that of 
Situational Awareness, described by Endsley [25, p. 97] as “…the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of space 
and time, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status in the near future.” Lower Situational Awareness has been linked to 
increased participation in unsafe behaviours and the “prevention of 
industrial accidents includes the ability of workers to maintain awareness 
of work environment, understand the information it holds, and predict 
how situations will develop.” [26, p. 80]. If job demands and resources 
are not conducive to Situational Awareness then safety is likely to be 
compromised. 
 
Information and communication behaviour 
There are key concepts used both in this literature review and the analysis 
and discussion below which require some theoretical framing to illuminate 
the theoretical base of this research. Information environment has been 
used previously by researchers in a variety of ways, including a 
geographical environment (for example, Europe [27]), the environment of 
a particular profession (for example, managers [28]) in which both their 
internal and external information environments are recognised, or much 
more broadly as a way of describing the ‘world of information’ in which 
the LIS domain researches [29]. Davenport [30], in describing an 
information ecology to examine an organisational information 
environment, identifies six components of an information environment: 
information strategy, information politics, information behaviour and 
culture, information staff, information processes, and information 
architecture. In the context of this paper information environment refers 
to the particular sources of information, flows of information, the need for 
and use of information in a particular context (here, an offshore 
installation). Information behaviour “encompasses information seeking as 
well as the totality of other unintentional or passive behaviours (such as 
glimpsing or encountering information), as well as purposive behaviours 
that do not involve seeking, such as actively avoiding information” [31, p. 
5]. For the purpose of the study described in this paper, information 
behaviour relates to all behaviour, including recognising an information 
need, using information and information sharing, which the OIM engages 
in in order to carry out their role effectively. Additionally ‘sources’ refers 
to anything an OIM sees as being informative, whether formal or informal.      
Within the library and information science community there has been a 
steadily growing recognition of the need to focus attention on workplace 
environments, in terms of examining information behaviour and 
information use, and away from the more traditional library and education 
environments [see for example, 32, 33, 34]. This shift has taken the 
discipline into business environments; workplaces which would 
traditionally be considered as information saturated in the conventional 
sense [see, for example, 35, 36], but also to less conventional workplace 
environments such as those of firefighters [37] and fishermen [38]. This 
shift in attention is driven by the understanding that the effective use of 
information is linked to organisational measures of business performance 
and success, for example Lloyd [39, p. 88] argues: 
 “…in an information-driven economy, employees who are able to 
develop information pathways and to create new corporate knowledge 
provide the strategic difference between a highly successful business and 
those that remain mediocre.” 
 
Choo [40] reports on the use of information in organisational contexts, 
discussing information barriers which may prevent organisations from 
observing and acting upon warning signals. Barriers identified include: 
epistemic blind spots; the selective use of information or use of 
information to confirm beliefs: risk denial; when values, norms and 
priorities influence the use of information so that no action is taken: 
structural impediments; when the supply and flow of information affects 
the organisation’s ability to detect, mitigate and recover from failures. In 
the context of offshore oil and gas installations such information barriers 
could lead to the realisation of a MAH, and in terms of health, safety and 
emergency response information, its effective use goes beyond being a 
‘successful business’ or being ‘mediocre’, but can lead to the avoidance of 
a major accidents and the saving of lives. Ibrahim and Allen [41] reported 
on information sharing during emergency response incidents, finding that 
trust during such incidents can be built and maintained through the 
sharing of information. 
 
One key area of information sharing, the shift handover, has long been 
acknowledged as a weak spot in the communication chain and, as 
previously stated, was a contributing factor to the Piper Alpha disaster. 
Brazier and Sedgwick [42] highlight the challenges of a fragmented 
workforce both in terms of contract and working relationships; a written 
policy may not reflect the reality of communication and information flow, 
in particular in a workforce constituted of a mix of contractors, sub-
contractors and company employees. Deficiencies in shift handover can 
include the communication of incomplete information, the 
misunderstanding of information or the poor presentation of information. 
Joseph [43], whilst examining the information seeking and communication 
behaviour of petroleum geologists (who may not necessarily be based in 
offshore environments or hold responsibilities equivalent to those of OIMs) 
offered interesting insights into the changing information landscape of the 
industry. A greater reliance on technology for information display, 
acquisition and communication influences the behaviour of individuals in 
the industry. There is less face to face communication, and globally 
disparate experts can collaborate in real time to formulate solutions to 
problems. Joseph [43] confirms that individuals find it difficult to know 
where to look for specific information and there is a steep learning curve 
associated with the introduction of new information sources. 
 
The oil and gas industry relies on multiple complex systems to store, 
retrieve, create and communicate information relating to health and 
safety. Safety management systems in their varying forms are constituted 
of several important elements: work control; supervision; competence; 
and effective safety leadership [44]. Knowledge is required to underpin 
effective systems, and can manifest itself in two ways, either through 
procedures, processes and operations, or through technical, human and 
organisational aspects [45]. Such systems facilitate the development of 
Situational Awareness, however there are issues surrounding the use of 
systems for this purpose, with Endsley [46, p. 4] suggesting “the problem 
with today's systems is not a lack of information, but finding what is 
needed when it is needed”, a well-known problem to the LIS community 
and one which is considered by Saracevic and Wood [47] in the theory of 
information consolidation. Equally the problem of satisficing has been 
reported [48] when the effectiveness of such systems is undermined by 
time constraints leading to the use of information which is incomplete. 
Similarly the issue of information filtering plays a role in the offshore 
environment, especially during an emergency response situation. 
Savolainen [49] describes a filtering strategy which “is based on the need 
to focus on the most useful information by systematically weeding out 
useless material from sources chosen for use”, and is a strategy 
associated with satisficing. The impact such filtering of information could 
have on maintaining safe operations or in resolving an emergency 
situation is unknown. 
 
Research on communication in the oil and gas industry has previously 
focussed on oil and gas companies’ interactions with external 
stakeholders, often during a crisis or potential reputational damaging 
incidents [50] where there could be the desire to stifle or prevent 
information exchange with the external world. Yet communication – both 
verbal and non-verbal – plays a significant role in the workplace and “lies 
at the heart of effective management” [23, p. vi], with managers playing 
a significant part in the maintenance of effective information flows. The 
best communication practices in top companies [23] include high levels of 
visibility of senior management with time taken to talk to employees, and 
ensuring that face to face and two-way communication is extensive. Non-
verbal communication plays a decisive role in conveying information and 
in forming judgements about others, and can be considered a more 
“truthful” form of communication in that it offers insights into what may 
lie behind verbal messages; non-verbal communication is also often 
associated with feelings and attitudes [23]. This is especially important as 
“sometimes non-verbal signals and speech contradict each other, in which 
case we are more prone to believe what we see than what we hear” [18, 
p. 173]. 
 
Dervin [51] suggested it was ‘dubious’ to assume that people only acquire 
information through formal sources, and that informal sources are used 
much more frequently. Case [31] in his seminal work concludes that 
empirical research suggests that formal information sources are rarely 
used, and informal sources are used much more frequently. The 
differentiation between formal and informal sources of information was 
highlighted by Kaye [52, p. 13] “Formal sources may be defined as those 
which are constituted in some regularized or legal manner in relation to 
the user, whereas informal sources have no such basis. Formal sources 
are often also impersonal, and informal sources are likewise often 
personal”. Choo and Auster [1993] suggest that informal sources are even 
more important to managers than other work groups. The author also 
makes a distinction between internal and external sources of information. 
The importance of informal communications in workplace environments 
[Allen and Cohen 1969] and of information ‘gatekeepers’ have also been 
highlighted [Ladendorf 1970].   
 
Research has been conducted in various workplace settings on the use of 
formal and informal sources of information with independent retail 
entrepreneurs [Lindblom 2008] found to equally prefer both sources, 
however formal source use was linked to an increase in sales in a 
preliminary study, and Finnish corporate finance professionals [Huvila 
2013] preferring less formal and social sources of information. 
Interestingly their success was reliant on their ability to combine formal 
information with informal cues and their previous experience, rather than 
not having a specific piece of information. More relevant to the present 
study, engineers [Ward 2001] were found to use formal and informal 
information sources in a complimentary way, and aerospace scientists and 
engineers [Guruprasad and Marimuthu 2014]. were equally found to use 
both formal and informal channels to satisfy both their communication and 
information needs.    
 
Previous research into information behaviour and communications, 
therefore, highlights theoretical insights with relevance for safety and 
emergency response in (i) the importance of and barriers to maintaining 
open, trusted and authoritative channels of communication; (ii) challenges 
to the swift and easy access to relevant, trustworthy and comprehensible 
information at times of pressing need; (iii) the tendency of individuals to 
‘accelerate’ information processing in times of emergency, filtering without 
due care and ultimately using incomplete or incorrect information in 
crucial decision making; and (iv) the criticality of two relatively 
unexplored categories of information, that which construes a warning 
signal and information which aids Situational Awareness. 
 
Aims and Objectives 
2013 marked the 25th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster, instigating 
reflection throughout the industry [see for example, 60, 61]. Given Lord 
Cullen’s emphasis on the role of the OIM in the disaster and the 
subsequent developments that have taken in the industry in the selection, 
training and monitoring of OIMs [14], it appeared apposite to target this 
group as a focus for research on industry safety leadership, through a 
qualitative, exploratory research project designed to explore the role of 
OIM in leadership of health, safety and emergency response. 
As part of a broader study, which considered topics such as safety culture, 
emergency response and the personal attributes required and feelings 
associated with being an OIM, the role of information and communication 
in health, safety and emergency response leadership was explored to 
allow the research team to begin to understand the OIM’s information 
behaviour and environment. 
 
The aim of the present study is to explore the information behaviour and 
environment of the OIM in terms of their role in safety leadership. 
Research objectives are (i) to gather and interpret data from OIMs in 
order to understand the ways in which they use and communicate safety 
information in order to fulfil their post holding duties; (ii) to determine 
whether there are distinctive factors specific to the role or context of 
operation which influence the effectiveness of their information behaviour; 
and (iii) to determine if there are distinctive characteristics of safe 
operations which affect information behaviour. 
 
Methodology 
Of the 288 installations in the North Sea, 149 of those are manned and 
therefore require the presence of an OIM. There is no publically available 
register of all OIMs currently working in the North Sea, and indeed there 
are likely to be individuals who are trained as an OIM however do not 
currently hold the post. Throughout the globe there will also exist 
individuals with a wealth of experience of working in the North Sea as OIM 
but who have been attracted overseas. 
 
An exploratory approach was taken to the research, utilising interviews to 
gather qualitative data for subsequent analysis. Interview participants 
were identified through the project team’s industry contacts and through a 
call for participants on LinkedIn. As exploratory research, 10 in-depth 
interviews were conducted with 11 participants, with one interview 
conducted with two OIMs from the same platform. Conducting intensive 
interviews allowed for the gathering of a high volume of qualitative data 
[31], enabling a rich, detailed understanding to emerge of the OIMs’ 
picture of their role in their own words, both holistically and more 
specifically around their information environment and behaviour. Use of a 
qualitative interview method in this context elicited results which are 
particular to the specific circumstance; that of OIMs in offshore contexts. 
The offshore oil and gas industry is one little examined by the LIS 
community, and the OIM a position never targeted LIS researchers, 
therefore exploratory research was required to develop initial 
understanding of future potential areas of research. 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the employment status, industry 
experience and role experience of interviewees. All interviewees had held 
the role of OIM on more than one offshore installation, either as OIM or 
stand-in OIM3. Four interviewees were retired, and six were currently 
employed as OIMs. Both retired and current OIMs were sought as 
interview participants to allow the changes in safety leadership pre-Piper 
Alpha and post-Piper Alpha to be understood in the context of the wider 
study. In the context of LIS research this elicited experiences the 
introduced and proliferation of ICTs has brought to the OIM’s workplace. 
All of the OIMs interviewed had experienced a critical incident, but only 5 
of the interviewees had lead a team through a critical incident. All of the 
OIM were men.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Employment 
status 
Experience in oil 
and gas industry 
Experience as 
OIM 
 
OIM 1 Retired 40+ years 4 years 
OIM 2  Retired 40+ years 6 years 
 
OIM 3  Current 32 years 8 years 
 
OIM 4  Current 20 years 6 years 
OIM 5  Current 29 years 5 years 
 
OIM 6  Current 35 years  10 years 
 
OIM 7   Current 33 years 11 years 
 
OIM 8 Retired 43 years 6 years 
OIM 9 Current 28 years 8 years 
OIM 10 Retired 32 years 8 years 
 
OIM 11 Current 13 years 9 years 
 
Table 1. Interviewee employment history. 
        
      
Interviewees were asked what kinds of information they required for their 
role in terms of health, safety and emergency response and how they 
shared such information. To facilitate this, a modified version of the 
critical incident technique was then used to elicit instances of information 
behaviour in the workplace environment, a method which has been 
utilised by other researchers to gather examples of information behaviour 
in relation to work tasks [see for example, 62, 63, 64]. Additionally OIMs 
were asked to consider the sharing of best practice with their workforce 
and the sharing of information with other OIMs, and whether these had 
taken on increased significance since the Piper Alpha disaster. 
 
The interviews lasted between 50 minutes and two hours; this highly 
qualitative, exploratory approach allowed for the identification of 
emerging themes as indicators of the information environment and 
behaviour of the OIMs. Each interview was recorded, transcribed and 
subsequently analysed by the research team; in total the interviews 
produced 217 A4 pages of transcribed verbatim. An iterative analytical 
approach was undertaken by one member of the research team, who had 
also conducted all interviews, ensuring coder reliability. A coding structure 
was developed  inductively, building the codes upwards from the interview 
content and identifying mayor themes and trends. The themes coming 
from the interviews were largely consistent across interviewees, apart 
from when highlighted in the findings and discussion below.  
 
Interviewees were assured anonymity in any research outputs and 
participants were open and showed willingness to talk honestly about their 
role, as supported by the length of some interviews. As participation in 
the research project was voluntary it should be borne in mind that those 
OIMs who volunteered may be of a more proactive and participative 
inclination. While the sample size was small, the wealth of qualitative data 
gathered allowed the authors to test where findings illuminate or inform 
earlier research in terms of the development of theory as well as 
contributing towards the shaping of themes for future research. 
 
Findings 
The offshore installation manager’s information environment 
The OIM’s health and safety information environment is a complex one. 
OIMs work shift patterns similar to other offshore workers, with typically 
two or three weeks offshore followed by equivalent periods onshore. They 
have back to back counterparts with whom they share the role. To ensure 
hydrocarbons are produced, not only using the latest innovations, but 
safely, the OIM is exposed to and requires access to substantial amounts 
of diverse health, safety and emergency response information from 
various sources. This must be used effectively along with personal 
knowledge and crew knowledge, communicated between their offshore 
workforce and the company onshore. This flow of information to and from 
the OIMs constitutes a significant part of the OIMs information 
environment, and is further described below. 
 
Further significant parts of the OIM’s information environment are 
documentary information sources. A commonly cited source of information 
consisted of emergency response manuals and plans, with seven OIMs 
suggesting these were sources which were essential to their role. This was 
often attributed by interviewees to the fact that during an emergency 
situation there is a heavier reliance on such procedures, as at such points 
conscious thought processes cannot be relied upon with participants 
describing the mind ‘going blank’: in these circumstances individuals must 
rely on rote memory, instinct and/or simple guidelines, checklists and 
mnemonics which provide clear, simple and unambiguous information 
about the actions to be taken. The importance of training and previous 
experience in terms of providing internalised knowledge and sources of 
information about what to do cannot be underestimated in such situations, 
as well as during normal operations, as a valuable source of information 
for OIMs: this was described by one participant as the information ‘you 
would carry about in your head all the time’. 
 
The safety case was also cited by seven OIMs as being an essential source 
of information for their role in terms of health, safety and emergency 
response. This is a document which details the design and efforts 
undertaken to prevent MAHs on offshore installations. Operating 
companies for offshore installations must submit, and have accepted, a 
safety case to the Health and Safety Executive before commencing 
offshore operations. Interviewees explained that as developments in 
technology have advanced, the safety case, a large document often 
comprised of several folders, is now available in electronic format – most 
usually a PDF. Research suggests that information users have a 
preference for electronic access when available [see for example, 65, 66], 
however the OIMs interviewed suggested that use of the safety case was 
dependent on the purpose of its use: 
“We have the safety case in PDF format readily accessible, you can do a 
quick search on a word and go straight to your section. It’s great … That 
said, if you want to go and leaf through it on a topic it’s much easier to do 
it on paper than it is electronically.” 
 
Company operating procedures and health and safety regulations were 
also identified as a source of information required by the OIM. Such 
documents are often stored together in a ‘big cupboard’, with additional 
copies stored in various locations throughout the installation. They are 
consulted as needed, usually to refresh the OIMs’ knowledge of 
requirements or procedure for a particular circumstance: 
“…and the little light will come on at the back of your head, there’s a rule, 
there’s something about that somewhere, and then we have to spend 
some time to go find it.” 
 
The research team felt there was a clear sense of distinction between 
sometimes needed information, when it was simply necessary to know 
where to look for the information, and the always needed information, 
upon which the OIM could fall back in time of limited information access 
and great urgency. The interviews revealed that the existence of an 
emergency set aside all normal safe operation expectations and the 
research team believe that the means of accessing and processing 
information in such circumstances are fundamentally different from the 
normal mode. These circumstances arguably mirror those faced by the 
armed forces in battle conditions, when expectations regarding 
information processing and communication differ markedly in the field 
from those that prevail in headquarters. There are similarities in the 
offshore/onshore environments that could form useful grounds for further 
exploration. 
 
In addition to the sources of information highlighted above, OIMs receive 
an influx of information daily through phone calls, visitors to rigs and e-
mails. Interestingly despite the difference in workplace environment 
compared to, for example, a traditional office, ITC developments have 
similarly increased the amount of daily information received by the OIM. 
The bureaucratic duties required of an OIM were reported to conflict with 
the need to engage with the workforce and build relationships: 
“…there were never enough hours in the day to do all the things I wanted 
to do. And I did find quite often that the demand coming from onshore for 
paperwork very often clashed with what I wanted to do in terms of getting 
outside eyeballing and doing things with people.” 
 
Due to the unique workplace environment of offshore operations there are 
always hard copies of essential documents, such as the safety case and 
emergency response procedures, in case of power cuts, communications 
failures or a need for rapid evacuation; there may not always be the 
capacity to consult an electronic version of information. The OIM’s 
information environment is therefore comprised of core reference 
materials, such as the safety case, supplemented and updated by a 
constant flow of new information, for example from onshore, through 
operating or contracting company employees, and often received by e-
mail. Information sources can be explicit in terms of documents, for 
example or tacit in the form of previous experience or workforce based 
knowledge. Equally in emergency situations, there is a supplemental need 
for situational information to consider alongside guidelines on actions to 
take, where for example it is constantly necessary to access information 
about how the environment is changing and what new factors are 
affecting decisions that must be made. 
 
The OIM’s role in mediating and communicating information  
Within a complex information environment OIMs have responsibility for 
communicating information to their workforce. Commitment to safety 
must be demonstrated from the top down, a principle which was 
confirmed by all interviewees and by previous research [1; 2; 3], and 
integral to demonstrating this commitment is the communication of 
information to the workforce in the operational frontline environment; a 
caveat also agreed upon by all interviewees. With the OIM holding legal 
responsibility for the health and safety of people on board their 
installation, the moral and legal obligation of sharing information brings 
an interesting dynamic, and is a significant driver for the effective sharing 
and communication of information to the workforce. In an emergency 
situation the heightened potential for loss of life was identified by the 
OIMs an even greater driver for effective communications. 
As mentioned above, offshore workforces can be comprised of core 
operating staff or contractors and sub-contractors. They may not all be 
native speakers of English, and may have differing past experience of 
communication and information use. This presents a challenge for the 
OIM: 
 
“…the OIM is generally the company representative. A large percentage of 
the crew are non-company staff. So you have to make sure the company’s 
core principles are maintained…It could be as much as 80 or 90% of the 
population are non-company personnel.” 
 
In the offshore environment the OIM acts as a gatekeeper of information 
flow between several facets of the personnel functions on offshore 
installations. They act as a fulcrum through which information is 
exchanged between the onshore company and the offshore workforce and 
a multimodal approach is taken by OIMs to communicating information, 
both in terms of formal and informal communication. Formal 
communication centres on messages which may need to be transmitted to 
the whole workforce or a distinct subset, while less formal communication 
tends to take place through ad-hoc interactions. The majority of 
communication of health and safety information is undertaken face to 
face, acknowledged by all OIMs, through safety meetings, drills and 
exercises, shift briefs, meetings with department heads and toolbox talks 
(time taken out of normal work practices to discuss a certain aspect of 
health and safety, which may precede a particular job which requires 
action not regularly taken, or merely as a refresher). The emphasis on 
face to face communication is interesting given the comments from 
Joseph [43] surrounding the infrequency of face to face communications 
due to the proliferation of information technologies. It is also believed that 
face to face communication is more influential and necessary in safety 
leadership than in less senior or safety pertinent roles. The present results 
would also suggest that increased bureaucracy is reducing OIMs’ capacity 
to engage in face to face communications. 
“Plus you’ve got to manage the information flow that coming into your 
office. At the moment I don’t think we can take much more and do the job 
that we’re there to do.” 
 
Personal engagement was also felt by OIMs to enable what was described 
as a ‘two way street’, providing opportunities for OIMs not only to pass on 
information to the workforce but also for the workforce to seek 
clarification through questioning and feed-back information to the OIM. 
Informal communication relies heavily on the visibility and approachability 
of the OIM, something which was highlighted by nearly all interviewees 
and was regarded as essential in maintaining the two way street of 
communication. This was seen as a way for the OIM to learn from their 
workforce, gathering a true picture of reality ‘at the coal face’, an 
opportunity for them to inform but also to become better informed. This 
concept of encouraging leaders to ‘listen’ for pertinent information and to 
understand what they hear is one that is being embraced by some oil and 
gas operators. 
 
“Part of their job is actually walking round and talking to people, 
communicating, making sure people are working safely, got to do your 
rounds, got to show your face, you can’t just be isolated in your room.” 
 
Integral to communication and personal engagement is the notion of 
‘walking the walk, not just talking the talk’. All OIMs interviewed 
recognised the importance of the OIM not just verbally attaching 
importance to safety issues but confirming them by acting in a safe 
manner and modelling correct behaviours. This was also considered 
important in the communication of OIMs’ attitudes and how they are 
perceived by the workforce: 
 
“…how you respond…gives the impression of how you’ll respond to various 
other things…You have to have a measured approach to the safety 
incident that you’ve had. If you go to the nth degree of analysing why 
someone’s jammed their finger in the door when you have something 
more significant, that loses all credibility” 
 
The OIMs’ accountability for the maintenance of safety standards offshore 
is therefore communicated both verbally and physically. Non-verbal 
communication is used as a way of complementing the spoken word and 
conveying the company’s social and cultural identity – ‘the way we do 
things around here’ – but can also be important in creating open and 
trusting communication channels between the OIM and the workforce in 
establishing the genuineness, or what is increasingly being described as 
authenticity, of the OIM’s approach to safety management and leadership. 
Interviewees emphasised their sense of personal accountability for safety 
leadership as one with real, perhaps fatal, consequences. It is also a role 
that participants described as one of great personal isolation, in particular 
given their duty as post holder enshrined in legislation. 
 
“I have seen, over the years, some appalling behaviour by OIMs who have 
abused the authority and the autonomy that they have in order to satisfy 
their own petty little egos. And it is utterly unpardonable. It is a great 
privilege not only to be left in charge of a multi-billion pound piece of 
equipment … but to be responsible for the safety and wellbeing of 100 or 
more people and also to have an influence on the behaviour, and dare I 
say it, the morality. You project your sense of right and wrong. And that’s 
pretty scary.” 
 
Any perceived mistrust in the communication channels for safety 
information could potentially lead to the non-reporting of safety related 
incidents. For example, participants were very aware that lack of trust in 
communication channels can lead to the creation of an incorrect picture of 
the safety landscape on an installation or within a company, could present 
a barrier to learning from incidents and performance enhancement or lead 
to situations where companies are unaware of risk escalation and 
therefore fail to take mitigating action. Participants felt that the 
combination of verbal and non-verbal communication by the OIM aids in 
the creation of an effective, safe and trusted reporting culture. 
 
There was evidence from the interviews of the selective cascading of 
information (sharing information) to the workforce which may need to be 
formally communicated.  
 
“Some of it’s not relevant to some people. It might be a briefing that’s 
only relevant to the drilling guys, it might be a briefing that’s only 
relevant to [certain] staff, that kind of thing.” 
 
This avoids information overload in the workforce and therefore better 
retention of information required for safe working. 
 
Whilst there was evidence of OIMs delegating information sharing duties 
to departmental heads and team leaders, there was also recognition from 
OIMs that there are times when they must communicate information with 
the workforce directly in a more formal manner. This was due to nearly all 
OIMs understanding that messages can sometimes be misconstrued when 
it is not heard ‘from the horse’s mouth’ or a message can be diluted or 
reinterpreted. This was felt to be especially the case if the information has 
negative connotations or could have negative consequences. 
 
“So if there’s a bad news item, it’s better coming from me because then 
everyone’s got one point of hate, which is fine. That’s the deal, that’s part 
of the joy of having the job. But better that because the team has still got 
to work together. And what you mustn’t do is dilute the information.” 
 
The delegation of information sharing was evidenced by interviewees 
during normal operations, but during emergency response situations it 
was reported that information seeking would also be delegated. This 
allows the OIM to keep the ‘big picture’ with supporting roles seeking the 
details required for handling a situation. To OIMs, knowing where to find 
information is considered more important than actually knowing the 
information, and there was recognition that often the rapidly changing and 
unpredictable situation means individuals do not know what they need to 
know, until they need to know it. 
“I’ve also had health incidents where I’ve to go to the medic and say 
“what is the procedure for dealing with this situation?” and he’s gone and 
got it and we’ve followed that procedure.” 
 
While managing the flow of information between onshore functions and 
the offshore workforce, as a precursor the OIM must manage the flow of 
information into their own office. The plight of e-mail communication and 
the ‘CC’ button was commented upon by one OIM, with the OIM therefore 
having a role in separating the ‘wheat from the chaff’ and establishing 
what information is important to them and their workforce. Additionally 
the OIMs must ensure communication with their back to back 
counterparts is maintained through their handover between shifts, 
especially when ensuring all core and non-core crew have received specific 
pieces of information: 
 
“…we always had to be wary of is the crew changes. Because it’s very 
easy to think that you’ve communicated [with everyone] but actually 
you’ve missed a whole bunch [of people] because they’re on the beach. 
So there’s always the need for the OIMs to ensure that when they change 
out they hand over to the oncoming OIM to say that there is all this stuff 
that needs to be communicated to the crew who isn’t here.” 
 
The notion of separating the wheat from the chaff whilst dealing with large 
volumes of information is an interesting one considering the importance 
placed on the establishment of safe and trusting channels for 
communication by the literature [for example, 20]. The OIM must use 
their, knowledge, experience, training and judgement to establish what 
information is indeed safety critical and necessary to be shared. If safety 
critical information is missed by the OIM and subsequently not 
communicated with the workforce, this may result in a safety incident and 
undermine the trust placed in the OIM. 
 
“And it’s trying to sort out the wheat from the chaff. In an emergency 
situation that is not easy. It is very, very difficult.” 
 
Ultimately the OIM must be a safe and trusted channel of communication 
for both the offshore workforce and for onshore headquarters, for both 
operator staff and contractors and in a context where the role is 
intrinsically both isolated and accountable. 
 
Information sharing within the wider professional group 
As the role of OIM has unique characteristics and OIMs constitute a 
comparatively small and easily identified group in the UKCS, interviewees 
were asked to what extent they shared health and safety information with 
other OIMs, if at all. The retired OIMs could not recall this ever happening 
in their tenure however current OIMs felt this was something which 
happened regularly within companies. There were several methods cited 
by interviewees for sharing information between OIMs, such as conference 
calls and internal networks. However the effectiveness of conference calls 
between OIMs within the same company was questioned by one OIM. 
Where these had formerly been informal and supportive, the participant 
felt that their value in encouraging open information sharing, in a 
confidential and safe environment, had been diminished when they 
became a formal meeting for which minutes were taken. This reduced the 
willingness to participate freely and share ”war stories” from the ”school 
of hard knocks”. 
 
Forums for cross company information sharing through informal social 
networks and initiatives such as Step Change in Safety were welcomed: 
 
“… there’s a lot more openness throughout the industry in terms of safety 
flashes, incidents that have occurred on other installations with other 
operators. We tend to hear about them whereas in the past you tended to 
hear about those things on the train going home…” 
 
Such sharing between companies was seen to be significant for health and 
safety in ensuring consistency. The increase in sharing of information 
between companies was attributed by interviewees to the industry as a 
whole “wanting to be better” and was something which had improved 
markedly since Piper Alpha. However, one interviewee commented that 
while UK legislation post-Piper had encouraged global sharing of learning:  
 
“nobody else changed their legislation. They all took the view that that’s 
not going to happen to us. Now if you look at Macondo, following that, the 
US is now driving through major changes in their legislation and 
enforcement of other pieces of legislation that were already there.” 
 
While traditionally sharing of information had centred around learning 
from incidents, when something goes wrong, a shift towards sharing more 
positive safety related information was reported currently. However, the 
interviewees expressed that there continues to be a level of reluctance or 
hesitation amongst OIMs to share potentially commercial sensitive with 
peers in competitor organisations. There was no consensus by the OIMs 
around whether an industry wide OIM forum would be beneficial, 
suggesting that there may be some way to go for the industry in 
encouraging a culture of transparent collaboration on safety to flourish. 
 
Discussion  
The OIM acts as a focal point in the communication of safety and 
emergency information in a complex and shifting information 
environment. They communicate with individuals onshore and offshore, 
often acting as a fulcrum between the two. Further they are at the centre 
of a matrix of onshore and offshore information sources and with sources 
of (i) formal and documented information sources and (ii) informal and 
tacit sources. Figure 1 seeks to model that role, illustrating the manner in 
which the OIM acts as a gateway or mode through which information 
flows and is filtered. 
  
Figure 1. Information Environment of the Offshore Installation Manager.  
Figure 1 indicates the reliance on both formal and informal information 
sources in terms of health and safety information in the offshore 
environment. This is supported by the work earlier cited of Case [31], 
Dervin [51] and Choo and Auster [53], although whether informal or 
formal sources are preferred by the OIM will require further research. 
Equally the importance of both formal and informal flows of 
communication is supported by Allen and Cohen’s [54] previous research. 
The importance of an information gatekeeper, highlighted by Ladendorf 
[55], is certainly exemplified in the case of the OIM and their role as both 
a communicator of information as well as a seeker of, and source of 
information for the workforce, is essential to maintaining safe operations 
on offshore installations.  
 
The concept of the importance of ‘listening’ for pertinent and critical 
information, both from the workforce and from company headquarters 
onshore, was one that was embraced by OIMs. The research team believe 
this listening mode to link to the concepts of information scanning, 
selection and filtering that is central to theory around information 
consolidation [47]. It might provide a very useful way of translating 
information behaviour research into the discipline of business 
management and leadership theory. It was thought to be a key skill in 
both demonstrating the genuineness and authenticity of leadership safety 
values but also in demonstrating the trustworthiness of leadership, 
confirming Ibrahim and Allen’s [41] findings that trust can be built and 
maintained through information sharing. The information barriers 
described by Choo [40] appear to be ones which OIMs are aware of and 
actively seek to overcome.  
 
The research results enrich understanding of the information environment 
of the OIM. While there may be similarities with other leadership contexts, 
the OIM role presents a particularly interesting field of study in that it 
demonstrates a number of very special characteristics. It is a role of 
immense responsibility and accountability, yet one which is very isolated. 
The research team believe that studying information behaviour in such a 
context allows the researcher to understand information behaviour more 
profoundly in two important contexts that have emerged from findings: (i) 
where the information is critical to the protection of both human life and 
the environment; and (ii) where the role holder must be able to act in an 
unpredictable and rapidly changing environment, where information need 
and the sources of information available may shift and change in a 
multiplicity of ways in a very brief time period. 
 
The current research findings suggest that it may be useful to theorise 
around the existence of two modes of information behaviour. The first 
might be termed everyday information need, where the information actor 
(the OIM in this instance) can draw on all available sources of information 
and has the time to access, select, verify, filter and apply the information 
before its use, in a preventative, enhancing or mitigating manner. The 
second mode of information behaviour would be that of emergency 
information need where the information will be needed rapidly, in stressful 
circumstances, with limited opportunity to verify before its use, usually in 
a capping or containing manner to limit harm to people and the 
environment. 
 
Everyday information need 
OIMs seek, use and share information to maintain safe operations on 
offshore installations. The OIM requires all of the resources, mechanisms 
and techniques for using and sharing information described above to fulfil 
their role in maintaining safe operations, including reliable access to 
information sources and expertise, as well as relying on previous 
experience and training.  
 
Their role is one which is well supported, with information being provided 
by the company on the beach, from contracting companies and their 
employees and from the offshore workforce. Access to resources was not 
identified as an issue by OIMs in this study; however having the time to 
consider all information to indeed separate the ‘wheat from the chaff’ is a 
challenge. This echoes Endsley’s [46] concerns regarding the use of 
systems to maintain Situational Awareness, as the ability to find the 
information required when necessary is not always possible. OIMs are 
aware of their responsibilities for sharing information and the degree to 
which this can be vital in preventing risk escalation, they report little time 
to undertake the necessary selection and cascading to others and are 
conscious that the shift handover presents particular responsibilities and 
challenges for them in being certain that vital information is being passed 
on. OIMs were also conscious that they had a responsibility not just to 
ensure transmission of relevant information to the right recipients but also 
that they must seek not to overload individuals with too much 
information. 
 
The capacity to listen to information and to be regarded as a trusted 
source with whom the workforce and peers can share ‘bad news’ was 
highlighted but there was evidence to suggest that existing opportunities 
for such information exchange were not sufficiently safe in the sense of 
their being an assurance of confidentiality. The OIM must also consider 
other aspects of communication about safety, through for example, body 
language and modelling behaviours, and there was evidence from the 
current research that this was something to which participants were alert. 
The OIM must have an awareness of information which is required for 
their role, for example which regulations apply to specific circumstances 
or which company procedure must be followed. Equally the OIM must be 
able to make judgements on the relevance of information shared with 
them to their own role and to that of their workforce. A further challenge 
is presented by the extent to which the OIM gains information from 
multiple channels, both formal and informal, such as from systems, 
handbooks, and a wide array of colleagues and external contacts. Their 
information environment is one that could be described as ‘saturated’. 
Particularly important for the OIM given their responsibilities is that they 
should have the capacity to identify information which indicates 
heightened risk and that they should be conscious of the potential danger 
presented by subjective selection of information, where they may have 
become complacent or blind to information that does not match with their 
beliefs, and where they may therefore fail to respond to a changing 
environment. While this was not an aspect of information behaviour 
highlighted by participants as problematic, the results of disaster reviews 
[11, 13, 16] suggest that it is one that would be worthy of further 
investigation. 
 
Job demands [24] were found to play a role in the information and 
communication behaviour of OIMs. Workloads and competing demands 
were acknowledged by the OIMs to put a strain on their time however all 
OIMs recognised the importance and necessity of maintaining their 
visibility to the workforce, often coinciding with the sharing of information. 
Like their workforce, OIMs require safe and trusted mechanisms for the 
sharing of information. Whether the demands are sufficient enough to 
cause an accelerated processing of information [24] in an everyday 
environment would warrant further research, although there was evidence 
of selective filtering of information [49] due to situational constraints, 
including emergency situations. Whether this filtering is conducted in a 
systematic way as described by Savolainen [49] would warrant further 
examination. Everyday information demands on the OIM are therefore not 
insignificant however the extent to which this impacts safety leadership 
overall also requires further research. 
 
Emergency information need 
There is information which the OIM must know in order to react in an 
emergency situation. During such periods their environment may change 
dramatically in a very short space of time. They may move from an 
information saturated to an information deficit mode and they must have 
coping mechanisms to enable to undertake this shift. During an 
emergency response situation, as reported, it is possible to suffer from 
stilted recall of information or the ‘blank mind’ phenomenon. The role of 
recall is significant for the OIM, drawing on both extensive training and 
experience.  
 
Filtering  is much more difficult in an emergency [11] and the 
phenomenon of acceleration of information processing [49] which takes 
place during an emergency can result in a greater tendency to satisfice 
[48] which can result in the use of incomplete information and therefore 
have significant consequences in terms of maintaining safe operations 
during an emergency. Therefore at times when the consequences of poor 
or incorrect information are at their greatest, there is the greatest 
likelihood that individuals are less likely to use the best approaches to its 
acquisition and use. With warning signals becoming much more important 
in an emergency situation, the monitoring and awareness of these are 
vital. The capacity of OIMs to recognise warning signals or key information 
signals has not been fully tested. 
 
Equally Situational Awareness becomes even more important during an 
emergency, with OIMs requiring constant information on how the situation 
is changing, and what further information they require to be able to 
manage the changing situation. As lower Situational Awareness has been 
linked to increased participation in unsafe behaviours [25] this is 
especially important for the OIM in their leading role. Information about 
an evolving scenario can come in many forms but often would come from 
real time observations by the OIM or by others. Therefore the importance 
of maintaining an open and trusted information sharing environment, yet 
in a much more constrained model, is essential to maintaining effective 
Situational Awareness. 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of the present study was to explore the information behaviour 
and environment of the OIM in terms of their role in safety leadership. 
Data was gathered from OIMs about the ways in which they use and 
communicate safety information in order to fulfil their post holding duties. 
The discussion has highlighted themes emerging and in particular those 
which are felt to provide the most fertile ground theoretically include the 
personal sense of responsibility and isolation felt by the OIM, creating an 
environment where they are frequently the sole single individual in whom 
all knowledge rests, with very significant accountabilities both to their 
employer and more broadly in terms of their legal obligations. Distinctive 
factors specific to the role or context of operation which influence the 
effectiveness of their information behaviour were found, particularly in 
relation to the OIMs’ ability to ‘listen’ for pertinent and important 
information– the notion of being able to separate the wheat from the 
chaff. Further the absolute need for OIMs to represent a trusted and 
respected source for the workforce, both in acting in a confident and 
authoritative manner and in being reliable, honest and accurate in 
conveying and receiving information.  Distinctive characteristics of safe 
operations which affect information behaviour include the extent to which 
the OIM may not be able to predict in advance what information they may 
need particularly in responding to an emergency. Finally the importance of 
internalised knowledge, especially at times when other sources of 
information are unavailable, mean that the OIM must also be capable of 
fast and accurate recall of information as well as the ability to recognise 
swiftly where gaps in their knowledge exist.   
 
Implications of research findings   
Whilst this research was exploratory, the findings suggest some 
interesting areas for further research for the information science 
community. Previous studies into workplace information environments 
have largely focused on more traditional locales; the examination of the 
information environment on an offshore installation, where safety is 
paramount, offers an interesting, non-traditional workplace. Such an 
examination and the findings from it can aid in the development of 
products (for example, safety management systems) and in enhancement 
of the progression of education and training for individuals who work in 
dynamic, safety pertinent roles. With the attribution of major accident 
causes to deficient communication and information behaviour this in 
particular should be an impactful area for further research.  
The OIMs interviewed displayed a heavy reliance on informal knowledge 
or experiential recall, especially when dealing with an emergency 
situation, as a source of information. As with other workplaces and 
organisations more broadly this knowledge, if not formalised and 
recorded, will be lost with the individual in which it resides. The 
information science community can assist with developing knowledge 
retention policies and system development to make such knowledge 
accessible to future OIMs, workforces and beyond therefore adding value 
to organisational knowledge and assisting in maintaining safe operations. 
It has been argued in this paper that every day and emergency 
information needs are fundamentally different and result in different 
information behaviours. The whole notion of ‘emergency’ information 
seeking could and should be further explored in differing emergency 
contexts, to consider whether in these other emergencies information 
behaviour changes.   
 
Areas for further research  
There are several areas which warrant further research from the LIS 
community. This line of inquiry has the potential to impact positively on 
the safe operations of oil and gas installations. The significance of the 
Cullen Inquiry and the recommendations made still resonate within the oil 
and gas industry, and the information and communication dimensions are 
especially pertinent.  
 
The ability to synthesise information was identified by Cullen as a 
required, essential ability of OIMs, and the OIMs interviewed for the 
present research suggest this is a key part of their current role. However 
further research into the OIMs ability to judge the pertinence of 
information to maintaining safe operations, whether it is received verbally, 
electronically or by mnemonics, would further develop understanding of 
the role information, or more likely, missing or incorrect information, 
plays in safety and emergency response. The effect of an increased 
exposure to information during everyday life, largely down to the 
proliferation of ICT, changes the information behaviour of individuals and 
the impact this may have on the OIM’s behaviour is as yet unexplored. 
Equally ICT means that whilst onshore the OIM is likely to have a greater 
level of communication with offshore than when Cullen made his 
recommendations, the research team believe there is significant scope for 
further investigation into the information and communication habits of the 
OIM in terms of safety management beyond shift patterns and the 
platforms themselves, but rather as a professional group. How the shift 
handover can be effectively managed with assurances in place that all 
individuals have been exposed to the right information also remains an 
area demanding further research; the findings for the present research 
however indicate that attention should specifically be given to OIM 
handover between shift back-to-backs. 
 
Reliance on variant types of information to aid Situational Awareness in 
combination with the delegation of information seeking also provides an 
interesting focus for future research. How is knowledge co-created in 
offshore environments? At what stage does individual knowledge become 
group knowledge, or installation-wide knowledge? Does the composition 
and nature of the offshore workforce influence knowledge creation and 
knowledge sharing? As knowledge is required to underpin effective 
systems [45], be there safety management, maintenance or otherwise, 
this is an important area of further inquiry.  
 
The filtering of information and a tendency to satisfice by OIMs may be 
unsurprising however when considered in the context of the importance of 
building authoritative and trustworthy channels for communicating and 
sharing of information – which are an active demonstration of safety 
leadership - it is worthy to consider whether the act of communication 
itself illustrates commitment to safety, or whether the quality of the 
information which is shared is of greater significance in maintaining those 
channels. If the OIM incorrectly filters information or misses a warning 
signal due to satisficing, how does this impact the communication 
channels which have been developed? What role, therefore, does 
information play in authentic leadership? 
 
The oil and gas industry, specifically in the UKCS, is one which is currently 
experiencing a wave of change. Political and economic conditions have 
instigated reflection and analysis of current conditions and future 
mechanisms for working [67, 68], and the future of the industry looks to 
be one which will be dominated by collaboration, partnerships and 
enhanced communications in all aspects of operations. Therefore an 
understanding of the information environment, behaviour and needs of 
OIMs and other industry professionals is timely and necessary. 
 
Notes 
1. The Health and Safety Executive currently define a permit to work as “a 
more formal system stating exactly what work is to be done and when, 
and which parts are safe. A responsible person should assess the work 
and check safety at each stage. The people doing the job sign the permit 
to show that they understand the risk and precautions necessary.” The 
permit to work system is effectively a means of communication between 
management, supervisors, operators and those carrying out the work, and 
as a means of coordinating work activities [39]. 
 
2. In 2005 an onshore BP refinery in Texas City, Texas, exploded and 
killed 15 workers and injured around 170 others. Underlying causes of the 
incident were attributed to poor definitions and accountability for safety at 
different levels of management. The Baker Panel Report into the incident 
highlighted the focus on personal rather than process safety as a 
contributing factor to a false sense of control over the potential for a MAH 
to be realised [20]. 
 
3. All OIMs, on completion of training, are required to act as stand-in OIM 
for short periods of time before taking on the role proper. 
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